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Abstract 
 
This paper uses Markov-switching models to investigate the impact of oil shocks on real 
exchange rates for a sample of oil exporting and oil importing countries. This is an important 
topic to study because an oil shock can affect a country’s terms of trade which can affect its 
competitiveness. We detect significant exchange rate appreciation pressures in oil exporting 
economies after oil demand shocks. We find limited evidence that oil supply shocks affect 
exchange rates. Global economic demand shocks affect exchange rates in both oil exporting and 
importing countries, though there is no systematic pattern of appreciating and depreciating real 
exchange rates. The results lend support to the presence of regime switching for the effects of oil 
shocks on real exchange rates.  
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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies have explored the empirical relationship between oil prices and exchange 
rates with mainly three different types of econometric tools: cointegration methods, Granger-
causality tests, and vector autoregression (VAR) models. An example for the application of 
linear cointegration tests to this relationship is Amano and van Norden (1998a).  They find 
evidence, as did others, in favor of cointegration between the real price of oil and the real 
effective US dollar exchange rate over the period from 1972 to 1993.  Also, real oil prices are 
shown to Granger-cause real exchange rates and an oil price increase leads to an appreciation of 
the US dollar in the long run.  Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2008) confirm this result with data up to 
2004 using similar econometric tools.  However, they observe that in the period from 2002 to 
2004 the US dollar depreciated while the oil price increased and suggest that a structural break, 
or regime change, occurred in 2002, though the post-break sample is too small to meaningfully 
test for breaks.   Sadorsky (2000) studies linear vector error-correction models and associated 
Granger causality for futures prices of crude oil with a trade-weighted index of exchange rates.  
Cointegration is supported and exchange rates transmit exogenous shocks to energy futures 
prices in the period 1987 to 1997.     
Reboredo (2012) considers instead linear and non-linear correlation, along with copula 
functions that capture symmetric, asymmetric and time-varying co-movements between the 
nominal oil price and various US dollar exchange rates for several oil exporting and oil 
importing, as well as developed and emerging economies, in the period 2000 to 2010.  Co-
movement is found to be weak, especially among oil-importing countries, but has generally 
increased after the global financial crisis from mid-2008, a break date associated with the global 
economic recession.   On the other hand, Akram (2009) applies a structural VAR model and 
finds instead that a weaker (real) US dollar leads to higher real oil prices in the period 1990 to 
2007.  Fratzscher et al. (2014) also employ a structural VAR that includes the effective US dollar 
exchange rate along with a measure of options exchange market volatility and a proxy for the 
financialisation of the oil market.  Five episodes of different time-varying correlation 
(heteroscedasticity) regimes are calculated from VAR residuals in order to aid with the 
identification of structural shocks.  They find bi-directional causality between the US dollar and 
nominal oil prices since the early 2000s. They claim that their model can account for the strong 
and rising negative correlation between oil prices and the US dollar since the early 2000s.     
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In a previous paper (Basher et al., 2012), we have used a structural VAR in order to model 
the oil market with oil supply and demand as advocated in a seminal paper by Kilian (2009), in 
contrast to the above studies that do not separate out the underlying sources of the oil price 
movements.  Kilian (2009) shows that the impact of oil price changes on the economy depends 
upon whether the oil price change originates from an oil supply shock, an oil-market specific 
demand shock, or a global economic demand shock.  We find in our paper no significant effects 
of oil supply shocks on the exchange rate for emerging economies, whereas a positive global 
demand shock leads to a depreciation of the US dollar, which appears consistent with a declining 
US dollar over the period 2002-2008.   However, we did not explore structural changes.   
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by allowing for nonlinearity for the effects of the 
three oil shocks, constructed according to Kilian (2009), on real exchange rates for a set of 
representative oil exporting and oil importing countries at the developed level and the emerging 
economies level:  Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom; Brazil, Mexico, and Russia; India, 
Japan and South Korea. The nonlinearity that we consider is in the form of different regimes for 
the effects of the three oil shocks, with constant parameters within a regime but different 
parameters across regimes.  We apply the Markov-switching model for this purpose.
1
 Hamilton 
(1994, Ch. 22) gives an introduction to Markov-switching models.  The Markov approach allows 
for time-varying causality across regimes instead of linear models with constant parameters and 
no regime (structural) changes.  The Markov-switching model has the advantage that it uses in 
the estimation information about the varying regime-switching probabilities of being in a 
particular regime instead of a linear model that would have to be estimated for each regime 
completely separately.   Estimation with linear models is therefore often not feasible due to sub-
samples being too small when there are several breaks present in a sample.  In other words, more 
observations are used for estimation in a Markov regime approach.  The estimation of parameters 
in one regime uses partly the dynamics of the system in another regime.
2
  Furthermore, to keep 
                                                 
1
 We rely on stationary variables.  The oil shocks in our analysis are generally covariance-stationary variables, as are 
the real exchange rate returns (expressed as first differences of the logs of real exchange rates) for the various 
countries.  Hence, cointegration modelling is not called for in our framework.   
2
 An alternative approach to ours would be a threshold or smooth transition model with an exponential or logistic 
transition function (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993).  However, this approach requires choosing a variable that 
triggers the transition between usually two or three regimes with abrupt (threshold) or smooth transition.  It is not 
obvious which variable could fulfill that function in the relationship between the three oil price shocks and exchange 
rates.  The transition variable is not a variable that is observable and it could feasibly be a different transition 
variable for each of the three oil shocks considered here.  
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the Markov-switching model parsimonious, we limit ourselves to a two-regime Markov-
switching model.  This is motivated by the work of Engel and Hamilton (1990), Dumas (1992), 
and Engel (1994). Dumas (1992) shows that, under the assumption of spatially separated 
countries and shipping costs, the real exchange rate switches between two states and exhibits 
mean reversion within each regime. Engel and Hamilton (1990) and Engel (1994) show that a 
simple two-state Markov-switching random walk model with drift allowing both the constant 
term and variance of innovations to vary during times of appreciation and depreciation is a fitting 
representation of nominal exchange rate regimes. On the other hand Mork (1989) argues for 
asymmetric effects of oil price changes, with increases in the real price of oil having much more 
predictive power for US real output growth than declines.  Hamilton (2003, 2005, 2009) uses a 
net oil price increase as the relevant variable to model the effect of oil prices on the economy.  
His oil price measure includes only oil price increases that represent new highs relative to the 
recent experience, or reversals of recent decreases.  Various definitions have been used with 
varying degrees of looking backwards to determine new highs of the oil price.
3
  Instead, the 
Markov-switching model has the advantage that it determines regimes from the data without 
imposing a strict formula for switches as Hamilton’s net oil price does.   The Markov-switching 
model has recently been applied to the relationship between oil prices and exchange rates by 
Beckmann and Czudaj (2013).  They use a different framework and do not study the sources of 
price shocks, as we do, when analyzing the Markov-switching dynamics between oil prices and 
exchange rates.  Their short-run nonlinear error-correction follows a Markov-switching regime 
that is embedded within a long-run linear cointegrating relationship (with no Markov-switching).   
We follow Kilian (2009) and apply a two-stage approach to examine the response of real 
exchange rates of selected individual countries to oil shocks. We first estimate a structural VAR 
model à la Kilian (2009) based on monthly data and use a Cholesky decomposition to obtain 
three different structural shocks: global economic demand, oil supply and oil-market specific 
demand shocks. We then analyze the impact of these shocks on real exchange rates in a Markov-
switching framework that captures the dynamic relationship between oil prices and exchange 
rates across different regimes within our sample. We find significant currency appreciation in oil 
exporting economies after an oil demand shock but not for an oil supply shock. The adjustment 
                                                 
3
 Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a, b) discuss further econometric complications with this measure of oil prices.  See 
also the reply by Hamilton (2011).   
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of exchange rates to a global economic demand shock reveals no particular pattern across oil-
exporting or oil-importing countries. Our results support the presence of regime switching for the 
effects of oil shocks on real exchange rates. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief discussion of theoretical 
transmission channels between oil prices and exchange rates and an overview of the related 
literature. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy, whereas Section 4 describes the data. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper.    
 
2. Theoretical considerations and literature review 
From a theoretical perspective, an oil price shock may be transmitted to a country’s exchange 
rate through two distinct channels: the terms of trade and wealth effect channels. The terms of 
trade channel impacts both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, albeit in different ways 
(e.g., Cordon and Neary, 1982; Amano and van Norden, 1998a,b; Backus and Crucini, 2000; 
Chen and Rogoff, 2003; and Cashin et al., 2004). For oil-importing countries, an increase in oil 
prices generally leads to a deterioration of the trade balance and subsequently to a depreciation 
of the local currency (Fratzscher et al., 2014). Whereas, for the oil-exporting countries, a positive 
terms of trade shock may eventually lead to a Dutch Disease phenomenon by driving up the price 
of the non-tradable goods and an appreciation of the real exchange rate (Buetzer et al., 2012). 
Empirical evidence for this view is provided by Backus and Crucini (2000), who showed that the 
variation in oil prices determines most of the variation in the terms of trade.  
The distinction between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries appears particularly 
relevant when we consider transmission through the wealth effect channel. According to this 
view, an increase in oil prices is associated with wealth transfer from oil-importers to oil-
exporters, which leads to a real depreciation (appreciation) of the exchange rates of oil-importing 
(oil-exporting) economies through current account imbalances and portfolio reallocation, 
respectively (e.g., Rasmussen and Roitman, 2011; Buetzer et al., 2012; and Fratzscher et al., 
2014). The basic theoretical framework of this channel is developed by Golub (1983) and 
Krugman (1983), whereas the related empirical evidence can be found in Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2007), Kilian et al. (2009), and Bodenstein et al. (2011). 
The empirical literature on the relationship between oil prices and exchange rate has evolved 
along multiple directions. Early research on the relationship between oil prices and exchange 
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rates often used cointegration techniques and many studies have found evidence of an 
appreciation of the US dollar in response to rising oil prices (e.g., Amano and Van Norden, 
1998a ; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Chen and Chen, 2007; and Coudert et al., 2008). Coudert et 
al. (2008) find that real oil prices, the real US dollar effective exchange rate and US net foreign 
assets are cointegrated.  Based on their analysis, oil prices affect exchange rates through the 
impact that oil prices have on US net foreign assets.  Cashin et al. (2006) investigate the 
relationship between the exchange rates of commodity exporting countries and the real prices of 
commodity exports for a sample of 58 developing countries. For approximately one third of the 
countries studied, they find a long-run relationship between exchange rates and commodity 
prices. Cheng (2008) estimates an error correction model between commodity prices, the US 
dollar, world industrial production, the Federal Funds rate, and commodity inventories. He finds 
that higher oil prices are associated with a depreciating US dollar and the effect is strongest over 
a period of several years. Lizardo and Mollick (2010) use cointegration techniques and find that 
an increase in the real price of oil leads to a depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the currencies 
of oil exporters like Canada, Mexico, and Russia. For oil importers, an increase in oil prices 
leads to a depreciation of local currency. Exchange rate forecasting models that include oil, tend 
to outperform those without oil. Akram (2009) estimates a structural VAR on quarterly data of 
OECD industrial production, real US short-term interest rates, the real trade weighted US dollar 
exchange rate, and commodity prices (one of which is oil). He finds that a dollar depreciation is 
associated with higher commodity prices. In reviewing the large and growing literature on the 
relationship between exchange rates and oil prices, Coudert et al. (2011) find a long-run 
elasticity between commodity prices and exchange rates of 0.5 for commodity exporting 
countries and an elasticity value of 0.3 for oil exporting countries. 
Given the uncertainty about the direction of causality between oil prices and asset prices 
(including exchange rates), Fratzscher et al. (2014) use an identification procedure in a structural 
VAR that exploits the heteroscedasticity in the data that allows them to separate the 
contemporaneous causality between oil prices and exchange rates from changes due to other 
observable and unobservable factors. Their results reveal that the causality between exchange 
rates and oil prices runs in both directions: a 10% increase in the price of oil leads to a 0.28% 
depreciation of the US dollar effective exchange rate on impact; whereas, a weakening of the US 
dollar by 1% causes oil price to rise by 0.73%. Interestingly, their variance decomposition shows 
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that a good portion of the observed negative oil price–exchange rate correlation is explained by 
risk shocks (e.g., the 2008-09 global financial crisis) and the financialisation process of oil 
markets. These results are in line with Grisse (2010) and Beckmann and Czudaj (2013) who also 
find that the causality runs in both directions. 
In contrast to the above studies, Buetzer et al. (2012) use a two-step approach that is similar 
to ours (in this paper) in the context of assessing the impact of oil price shocks on exchange 
rates.
4
 They first obtain different oil shocks using Kilian’s (2009) framework, and then analyze 
their impact on nominal and real exchange rates, as well as stock returns, for a large database 
comprising 44 advanced and emerging countries. Contrary to the predictions of the theory, they 
find no evidence of a systematic relative appreciation of oil exporters’ currencies against those of 
oil importers’ following oil shocks that increase the real price of oil. However, they document 
that an oil demand shock exerts significant appreciation pressures on currencies of oil exporters, 
which they tend to counter by accumulating foreign exchange reserves. Basher et al. (2012) 
extend Kilian’s (2009) three-variable structural VAR model of the crude oil market with other 
key macroeconomic variables and use a much less restrictive set-up (i.e., a non-recursive 
identification scheme) for the analysis of oil shocks in the context of emerging markets. We find 
in that paper no visible effects of oil supply shocks on the exchange rates, whereas an 
unanticipated global demand expansion has a downward (i.e., depreciation) impact on the US 
dollar. In comparison, the impact of a positive oil demand shock is negative (reflecting the so-
called numeraire effect) and lasts only for five months. This finding supports the conclusion that 
exchange rate movements are determined primarily by current account movements (Krugman, 
1983). Recently, Atems et al. (2015) apply Kilian’s (2009) methodology to examine the impact 
of oil shocks on exchange rates of six developed countries. Their linear model shows that 
following an oil-specific demand shock, exchange rates depreciate and the response is identical 
across oil exporting and importing countries. They also consider a nonlinear specification, where 
nonlinearity (or asymmetry) is defined depending on whether shocks are large/small or 
positive/negative. In general, they find that large and positive shocks have more significant 
bearings on exchange rates, than small and negative shocks.     
                                                 
4
 Baxter (1994), Huizinga (1987) and Carida and Gali (1994) establish the importance of real shocks in affecting 
exchange rates. 
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We differ from Buetzer et al. (2012) by incorporating nonlinearities for the effects of the 
various oil shocks on exchange rates by modeling a Markov-switching process.  Beckmann and 
Czudaj (2013) also apply the Markov-switching model to study the relationship between oil 
prices and exchange rates.  However, they do not model the oil market as in Kilian (2009) and 
hence do not separate out the sources of oil price shocks.  They use a vector-error correction 
model (VECM) with the monthly oil price, the domestic CPI, the foreign (US) CPI, and the 
exchange rate against the US dollar from mostly the 1970s to 2011.  Also, comparatively few 
studies have examined the question of how the impact of oil price shocks differs between oil-
exporting and oil-importing countries. For oil-exporting countries, Beckmann and Czudaj (2013) 
document a causality from exchange rates to oil prices for Brazil, Canada and Russia, whereas 
for Mexico and Norway an increase in oil prices is related to a depreciation against the dollar. In 
contrast, their results do not provide a clear pattern of causality for oil-importing countries. They 
also document evidence of nonlinear adjustment between oil prices and exchange rates stemming 
from different degrees of volatility and co-movements between these two quantities, as well as 
oil price shocks triggered by exogenous factors. Similar asymmetric adjustments between oil 
prices and exchange rates have also been documented by Roboredo (2012), who found that the 
oil–exchange rate co-movement has intensified in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.5 
This result is somewhat different than that of Fratzscher et al. (2014), who documented a steep 
decline in the correlation between exchange rates and oil prices during the period of the financial 
crisis in a linear VAR. 
The Markov-switching approach in a VAR (MS-VAR) has been applied in addition to study 
changes in Granger causality when regimes switch for the relationship between oil prices and 
stock markets.  Balcilar and Ozdemir (2013) use monthly data for crude oil futures prices and a 
sub-group of the Standard and Poors’ (S&P) 500 index in a two-variable MS-VAR with four 
regimes.  For the period from 1995 to 2011, they find that oil futures prices predict the S&P 500 
sub-group index but not vice versa.  Further, Balcilar et al. (2015) use a Markov-switching model 
with two regimes, a low and high volatility regime, in a VECM setting. They examine the impact 
of oil price shocks on the S&P 500 index for monthly data from 1859 to 2013.  They find in this 
two-variable model that high volatility regimes are more prevalent prior to the Great Depression 
and after 1973.  They also detect a tendency towards high volatility in recessionary periods.       
                                                 
5
 He applied non-linear measures of dependence: Spearman’s rho, Kendall’s tau and tail dependencies in copulas. 
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3. Empirical approach 
We employ a two-stage approach where we first construct the demand and supply shocks in 
the crude oil market using the identification procedure developed by Kilian (2009). Then, we 
empirically assess in the second stage the responses of exchange rates of selected oil-exporting 
and oil-importing countries to the demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market in a 
Markov-switching framework. In a regression context this means that the thus constructed oil 
shocks are orthogonal variables. Such variables are, as long as orthogonality holds, uncorrelated 
with other included and other omitted regression variables in the second-stage analysis and their 
regression coefficient estimates are unbiased.  In this case, the only effect of omitted variables is 
to increase the residual variance in the second stage Markov-switching regressions.   
The Markov-switching model captures potential nonlinearity or asymmetry in the process 
that drives the adjustment of the exchange rate to oil shocks. The Markov-switching framework 
has been proven to be useful in cases where the adjustment seems to be mainly driven by 
exogenous events.  There are numerous examples of such events in our sample period:  the 
Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Asian financial crisis in 
1997/98, production target cuts by OPEC in 1999, the dot-com bubble crisis in 2000, the terrorist 
attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Iraq War in 2003, the Global Financial Crisis in 
2007/08, OPEC oil production cuts in 2009, and the European sovereign debt crisis starting in 
2009, among others. We would like to emphasize that these events are treated as exogenous only 
with respect to triggering a regime switch for the Markov process and not with respect to their 
effects on the oil market and macroeconomic variables because we use Kilian’s (2009) approach 
to modelling the relationship between oil market events and the macro-economy.  In other words, 
the Markov regime generating process is exogenous.  Furthermore, the correlation between oil 
prices and exchange rates has historically fluctuated between positive and negative values. For 
example, the recent decline in oil prices has interesting parallels with the collapse in oil prices in 
1985-86, when the price of oil declined by 61% (from $24.68 to $9.62 per barrel) between 
January-July 1986 (World Bank, 2015). However, unlike today, the US dollar appreciated 
sharply during 1980-84 before depreciating even more sharply in 1985-87. This nonlinear or 
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asymmetric interaction between oil prices and exchange rates can be suitably captured by using 
the two-regime Markov-switching model.
6
  
 
3.1 The identification of global oil shocks 
The starting point of the analysis is a structural VAR (SVAR) model specified as 
                                         (1) 
where yt includes (i) global oil production, (ii) a measure of global economic activity and (iii) the 
real oil price in US dollars, described further in the data section;    denotes the vector of serially 
and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations that have an economic interpretation. The 
structural innovations are derived by imposing exclusion restrictions on   
   in      
    , 
where et is a vector of errors in a VAR (see Kilian, 2009): 
     
             
                                                           (2) 
In particular, the three structural shocks are attributed as follows:     denotes shocks to the 
global supply of crude oil (hereafter “oil supply shock”);     represents shocks to the global 
demand for all industrial commodities that are driven by global real economic activity 
(“aggregate demand shock”); and     captures an oil-market specific demand shock (“oil-specific 
demand shock”). The identification of   
   in equation (2) is achieved by imposing the following 
exclusion restrictions: 
    
   
     
   
   
   
   
   
     
       
         
  
   
                
   
                     
   
                        
                             (3) 
The identifying restriction in this structural model assumes that crude oil supply (production) 
does not respond to innovations to the demand for oil within the same month; i.e., the short-run 
supply curve of crude oil is vertical. Next, global real economic activity is driven by shocks that 
are specific to the oil market, but with a delay of at least a month. This restriction is in line with 
the sluggish adjustment of global real economic activity due to movements in oil prices. Finally, 
the real price of oil is assumed to respond to innovation to both oil production and global real 
                                                 
6
 For an application of the two-regime Markov-switching model to capture US business cycle expansion and 
contraction phases (regimes) that closely match the dates established ex-post by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, see Hamilton (1989).  Hamilton (1990) provides the econometric theory for Markov switching.  In 
addition, Engel and Hamilton (1990), Engel (1994), and Bergman and Hansson (2005) conclude that several real 
exchange rates can be described by a Markov switching autoregressive model. 
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economic activity within the same month. This restriction is plausible as any exogenous changes 
in crude oil supply or the real economy are immediately reflected in oil prices. See Kilian (2009, 
pp. 1059-1060) for a more detailed explanation on these identification schemes. In the estimation 
of the SVAR we follow Kilian (2009) and use the first difference of the natural logarithm of 
world oil supply, the de-trended index of real global economic activity, and the natural logarithm 
of real oil prices.  
As is quite common in the empirical VAR literature, we follow Kilian (2009) and do not 
impose unit roots and cointegration on the VAR.
7
 Sims et al. (1990) show that consistent 
parameter estimates can be obtained by applying least squares to levels VARs, even when unit 
roots and cointegration are ignored.  Hamilton (1994, pp. 651-653) provides further discussion 
on this approach and points out pitfalls of imposing invalid cointegration restrictions.  
 
3.2 Markov-switching 
As a starting point and in order to provide some baseline results, a linear regression model is 
estimated for each exchange rate. 
                    
          
          
                                              (4) 
Where Δfxi.t is the first difference of the log real exchange rate for country i. The oil shock 
variables are from the SVAR model described in the previous section (oil supply shock (εs), 
global economic demand shock (εd), oil demand shock (εp)). Notice that we make the assumption 
that the oil shocks are pre-determined. This is consistent with Kilian (2009, pp. 1065 – 1066). 
We also do not include lags of the oil shocks as explanatory variables because exchange rate 
markets are very efficient and new information is quickly absorbed by the exchange rate market 
when the shock occurs. A one period lag of the dependent variable is included as an explanatory 
variable because this specification provided better regression fit and residual diagnostics than a 
model without the lagged dependent variable. 
In order to account for the possible non-linear relationship between real exchange rates 
and oil shocks, a Markov-switching model for equation (4) is specified as follows. 
                          
             
             
                                              (5) 
                                                 
7
 Standard tests show clear evidence in favor of unit roots and cointegration for the change of the log of global oil 
production and the log of the real oil price, which are the variables that we used in our VAR.  On the other hand, the 
global economic activity index is stationary in levels. 
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The Markov-switching model takes into account the possibility that the impact of oil shocks on 
exchange rates is state (st) dependent. The probability of transition from state l at time period t to 
state m at time period t+1 depends upon the state at time period t and not any other state.
8
 It is 
assumed that the stochastic regime generating process follows an ergodic, homogeneous, first-
order Markov chain with a finite number of regimes (M) and constant transition probabilities. 
                                  
 
                                   (6) 
The Markov-switching models for exchange rates were estimated using the fMarkovSwitching  
package in R (Perlin, 2008). The models were estimated with two states, state dependent 
regression coefficients and state dependent volatility for the error process. Exchange rates are 
known to exhibit volatility clustering which is why we allow volatility to vary across regimes. 
Models were estimated using two different assumptions about the error term (normal, Student-t). 
Since the Markov chain is unobservable, the estimation output includes the probabilities 
of being in a specific state. A good fitting Markov-switching model is one that provides a sharp 
classification of regimes and has smoothed probabilities that are either close to one or zero. The 
regime classification measure (RCM) of Ang and Bekaert (2002) is used to determine the 
accuracy of the Markov-switching models. This statistic is computed using the following 
formula: 
            
 
 
       
 
   
 
                                                     (7) 
The RCM is computed as the average of the product of smoothed probabilities      where S is the 
number of regimes (states, S). The switching variable follows a Bernoulli distribution and as a 
result, the RCM provides an estimate of the variance. The RCM statistic ranges between 0 
(perfect regime classification) and 100 (failure to detect any regime classification) with lower 
values of the RCM preferable to higher values of the RCM. Thus to ensure significantly different 
regimes, it is important that a model’s RCM is close to zero and its smoothed probability 
indicator be close to 1. 
 
4 Data 
                                                 
8
 It should be noted that, within each regime, the Markov switching is conditionally linear; and the switching 
between regimes is inherently stochastic. The switching between regimes is assumed to be stochastic based on a 
time-varying transition probability matrix. In our model, the transition probability matrix changes depending on the 
values of the intercept, the variance, the three oil shocks and the one period lag of the dependent variable. 
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For this study, monthly data are required on world oil supply, global real economic activity, 
oil prices, and exchange rates. Real oil prices in dollars per barrel are measured using US refiner 
acquisition cost of crude oil (http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm#prices) deflated by the US 
CPI. World oil supply (in millions of barrels per day) and oil prices are sourced from the US 
Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/index.cfm ). 
An index of global real economic activity is taken from Lutz Kilian’s website (http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/paperlinks.html). The data are similar to those used by Kilian (2009) 
and Kilian and Park (2007). 
Nominal exchange rate data for Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway, India, Japan, South Korea, 
and the United Kingdom are sourced from the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s FRED database 
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/15). Except for the UK, exchange rates are quoted 
as foreign currency per US dollar. For the UK the exchange rate is quoted as US dollars per 
pound.
9
 Nominal exchange rates are converted to real exchange rates using the appropriate price 
(CPI) ratio between the two countries. The CPI data are available from the OECD 
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?querytype=view&queryname=221). The exchange rate between 
the Russian ruble and the U.S. dollar is sourced from Quandl (https://www.quandl.com/).  Brazil, 
Canada, Mexico, Norway, and Russia and the United Kingdom are classified as oil exporting 
countries. The United Kingdom became a net oil importer in 2005 but for most of the estimation 
period the U.K. was a net oil exporter. India, Japan, and South Korea are classified as oil 
importing countries. The estimation sample period varies by country due to data limitations. For 
Canada, Norway, India, Japan, and the United Kingdom, models are estimated over the period 
February 1976 to February 2014. For the other countries the estimation period is: Brazil 
(February 1995 to February 2014), Mexico (December 1993 to February 2014), Russia (February 
1998 to February 2014), and South Korea (May 1981 to February 2014). Consistent with 
previous studies, our choice of countries is determined by data availability of large oil exporting 
or importing countries with flexible exchange rates. Some large oil exporters (e.g. countries in 
the Middle East) and large oil importers (China) are excluded from our analysis because they 
have exchange rates fixed to the US dollar.  
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 We have stayed with the conventional way of quoting currency. Since the US dollar is the dominant traded 
currency, most exchange rates are quoted in direct form (the amount of foreign currency one US dollar buys). 
Currencies for commonwealth countries like England and Australia are, for historical reasons, quoted in indirect 
form (e.g., how much US currency one British pound buys). We have decided to stay with this convention. 
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Analysis is conducted for a group of oil exporting countries (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, 
Norway, Russia and the United Kingdom) and oil importing countries (India, Japan, South 
Korea). The plots of real exchange rates for oil exporting countries (Figure 1) and oil importing 
countries (Figure 2) show that each real exchange rate has experienced considerable variability 
across time. The real exchange rates of Mexico and Russia show a sharp appreciation followed 
by a long slow depreciation. The Indian real exchange rate has appreciated slightly over the 
sample period while the Japanese real exchange rate has depreciated. Notice that for several of 
the countries (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway, South Korea, and the UK) the starting and 
ending values for their respective real exchange rates are similar. 
The structural oil supply, demand, and oil price shocks are derived from the SVAR in 
equation (2). The SVAR was estimated with 24 lags. All of the characteristic roots are within the 
unit circle and the residuals are randomly distributed indicating a good fit for the SVAR. The 
structural shocks are plotted in Figure 3. Oil supply shocks show more variability in the first half 
of the data sample. Global economic demand shocks show more variability after the 2008 – 2009 
global economic recession. Oil demand shocks display more variability in the latter portion of 
the plot. 
For each country, monthly real returns on exchange rates are constructed using rt = 
100*ln(pt/pt-1) where pt is the real exchange rate in period t. Summary statistics on the shocks 
and real exchange rate returns are presented in Table 1. The mean value of each of the three 
shock variables is zero (to three decimal places) and each shock has a standard deviation close to 
unity. Each shock displays similar variability (difference between the maximum value and 
minimum value). Average exchange rate returns are small compared to their respective standard 
errors. The Russian Ruble has the greatest amount of variability (as measured by the difference 
between the maximum and minimum value). The currencies of Canada and Norway have the 
least variability. Compared to the other currencies, the currencies of Russia and South Korea 
have very high amounts of kurtosis. According to the Shapiro-Wilk test (normtest.w and p-
values denoted by normtest.p in Table 1), none of the variables are distributed normally. 
In order to further investigate the time series properties of the data, a series of unit root tests 
were conducted for each data series (Table 2). Two versions of the Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock 
(1996) Dickey-Fuller unit root test (DF-GLS) are shown: one with a constant (c) term and one 
with a trend (t). For these tests, 12 lags were chosen. In addition two versions of the 
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Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) KPSS tests are calculated (one with a constant (µ) and one with a 
trend (τ)). For the KPSS tests, the number of lags, for a sample size of n, was chosen according 
to       
 
   
 
 
 .
10
 In summary, there is ample evidence that each variable is stationary. Based on 
the DF-GLS and KPSS test results, the three oil shocks seems to follow stationary processes, 
except for the DF-GLS test with a deterministic time trend for the supply shock.  Further, the 
DF-GLS test supports that the real exchange rate returns follow stationary processes at the 5% 
significance level for almost all cases, whether a trend is included or not, except for India where 
only the trend specification supports it and Canada where the “constant only” case is supported 
at the 10% level.  The KPSS test results are in agreement with these results, except that for 
stationarity for Russia requires excluding the trend.  
The BDS test (Brock et al. 1987 and Brock et al. 1996) is used to investigate the spatial 
dependence of the real exchange rate returns. The BDS test is one of the most popular tests for 
nonlinearity. This test is carried out by testing if increments to a data series are independent and 
identically distributed (iid). This test is asymptotically distributed as standard normal under the 
null hypothesis of iid increments. The BDS test is based on the concept of a correlation integral. 
A correlation integral is a measure of the frequency with which temporal patterns are repeated in 
the data. For each real return exchange rate series, the null hypothesis that the data are iid is 
rejected for most combinations of m (embedding dimension) and ε (epsilon value for close 
points) at conventional levels of significance (Table 3). The plots of the real exchange rates 
(Figures 1 and 2) indicate little evidence of a linear structure. This observation combined with 
the results from the BDS test indicates there is likely to be a nonlinear structure in the real 
foreign exchange rate data. 
 
5 Results 
5.1 The impact of oil shocks on real exchange rates. 
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 Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) study the performance of the KPSS test in Monte Carlo simulations when the lag 
length is increased in small samples of typical size encountered in applications. They find that there is a trade-off 
between better size properties and a loss of power.  They look at replacing 4 under the radical with 12 and find that 
power losses are quite large, though size accuracy improves.  They point out that, in contrast to other related tests, 
the distribution of their test under the alternative hypothesis depends on the ratio of lags to sample size, even 
asymptotically, so that choosing more lags will cost power. Hence, we opt for less lags here in order to achieve 
reasonable test powers, as recommended by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).  However, we also re-estimated the KPSS 
tests using 12 lags and found the results to be similar to those reported in Table 2. 
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As a first look at the impact of oil shocks on real exchange rates, a series of linear regression 
models (equation (4)) is estimated where each country’s real exchange rate (FX) monthly return 
is regressed on the oil shocks and a one period lag of the real exchange rate monthly return 
(Table 4). These results can be viewed as baseline results showing the relationship between real 
exchange rates and oil shocks in the absence of any switching effects. The R-squared values for 
these regression range from a low of 0.0450 (Mexico) to a high of 0.1976 (South Korea). For 
each country the one period lag of exchange rates has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient with values ranging from a low of 0.0677 (Russia) to a high of 0.4374 (S. Korea) 
indicating a low to moderate degree of persistence in the real exchange rates. The results indicate 
that oil supply shocks have no statistically significant effects on real exchange rates in any 
country. This is consistent with the findings in Atems et al. (2015). For Canada, demand and oil 
price shocks each have negative and statistically significant impacts on real exchange rates. 
Shocks to these variables weaken the real $C/$US exchange rate which corresponds to an 
appreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the US dollar. For Norway and Russia the 
estimated coefficient on the oil price shock variable is negative and statistically significant. For 
the United Kingdom, the estimated coefficient on the demand shock is positive and statistically 
significant indicating that a global demand shock raises the real US/UK exchange rate. For 
Brazil, Mexico, India, Japan, and South Korea oil shocks have no statistically significant impact 
on real exchange rates. Overall, for five of the nine countries studied, oil shocks have no 
statistically significant impact on real exchange rates. This may in fact be the case or it is also 
possible that the relationship between exchange rates and oil shocks is non-linear and not being 
detected by a linear regression framework. 
To investigate the possibility of a non-linear relationship between exchange rates and oil 
shocks we now turn to the results from the Markov-switching models (equation (5)).  A number 
of features stand out. For the oil exporting countries (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, 
and the UK), the estimated coefficient on the lagged exchange rate variable is statistically 
significant in at least one of the regimes (Table 5). This result is important in showing that the 
importance of lagged exchange rates varies by regime. This pattern is also observed for the oil 
importing countries (India, Japan, and South Korea). For the oil exporting countries the 
estimated coefficient on the oil price shock variable is negative and statistically significant in at 
least one regime for Brazil, Canada, Norway and Russia. These results indicate that positive oil 
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price shocks have a negative impact on real exchange rates (measured as domestic currency per 1 
$US) indicating an appreciation of the local currency relative to the US dollar. For the United 
Kingdom, a positive oil price shock has a positive impact on US/UK exchange rate, indicating a 
real appreciation. This is consistent with prior expectations and empirical evidence that rising oil 
prices cause an appreciation of an oil exporter’s currency. In the case of Mexico, however, oil 
price shocks have no statistically significant (albeit negative) impact on exchange rates. Global 
economic demand shocks have a significant impact on exchange rates in Canada, Mexico and the 
United Kingdom. For both Canada
11
 and the United Kingdom, a positive global demand shock 
appreciates the real exchange rates, while it causes a real depreciation for Mexico. A global 
demand-driven shock would affect the oil exporters’ currencies both through a change in the 
price of oil and through a change in the demand for other goods they exports. Typically, this 
results in an appreciation of the domestic currency, thus generating a Dutch-disease-type effect. 
However, depending on the share of commodity exports to a country’s total exports, central 
banks have incentives to actively counter appreciation pressure by accumulating foreign 
exchange reserves (see Buetzer et al. (2012) for empirical evidence). This effect may lessen a 
systematic appreciation of exchange rates in oil-exporting countries (as predicted by the theory) 
in response to a positive global demand shock.  Except for Brazil, oil supply shocks do not have 
a statistically significant impact on exchange rates for oil exporting countries, which may seem 
surprising because for some countries (Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom) the sample 
starts in the middle of the 1970s, which coincide with the large production cuts during the second 
energy crisis in 1979. However, the energy crises of the 1970s were soon overshadowed by the 
oil glut in the 1980s. Comparing the RCM values for the oil exporting countries, we see that the 
Markov-switching model fits the data for the United Kingdom the best (smallest RCM value) 
while the poorest fit is recorded for Norway (largest RCM value). 
Turning now to the oil importing countries, we find that in response to a positive oil price 
shock the real exchange rates of India and Japan switch between depreciating and appreciating 
regimes. However, the variance of the appreciating/depreciating state is different between the 
two countries. Although it is difficult to pinpoint an exact rationale for these results, the swings 
may originate from economic fundamentals. For example, Kaminsky (1993) argues that if 
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 Charnavoki and Dolado (2014) find that a positive global demand shock appreciates the real exchange rate for 
Canada. 
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economic growth is relevant for exchange rates, then business cycle differences between 
countries can lead to persistent swings. Moreover, Evans and Lewis (1995) point out that rational 
traders’ forecast of the future exchange rate might explain the exchange rate switches between 
appreciating and depreciating regimes. Interestingly, both oil supply and demand shocks have a 
negative (i.e., appreciating) effects on the real exchange rate of South Korea, while a positive 
global demand shock causes a real depreciation, with all impacts being statistically significant in 
state 1 only. This counterintuitive finding that a positive oil price shock causes the oil importer’s 
real exchange rate to appreciate implies that a deterioration in the oil component of South 
Korea’s trade balance is not offset by an improvement in the non-oil trade balance, especially in 
the high volatility regime. Although in state 2 (low volatility regime) an oil shock leads to a real 
depreciation, the effect is not statistically significant.  By comparison, global demand shocks 
have a positive and significant impact on exchange rates for South Korea. Note that, by 
definition, global demand shocks are symmetric shocks, hitting both producers and consumers, 
in the same direction at the same time. Overall, the responses of the real exchange rates to 
various oil shocks vary substantially across oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, reflecting 
that exchange rates are affected by various country-specific differences in monetary and fiscal 
policies, exchange rate regimes, and product and labor market rigidities (Cashin et al., 2014).   
Among the oil importing countries, the RCM indicates the Markov-switching model has the 
highest classification for India and the lowest classification for Japan. This is confirmed by the 
very low values of the expected duration of being in a particular state (the Du1 or Du2 values 
reported in Table 5). Furthermore, based on the smoothed probability for all countries, each 
regime is highly persistent, as evidenced by the large constant regime probabilities p11 and p22, 
respectively.  
Notice also that the estimated coefficient on sigma is positive in each country and statistically 
significant in both states for each country except state 2 for Russia.
12
 Sigma refers to the standard 
deviation of each regime. It provides the magnitude of volatility (measured by the standard 
deviation) of each regime. The state with the largest estimated coefficient on sigma is the “high” 
volatility regime, while the state with the smallest estimated coefficient on sigma is the “low” 
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 As with any numerically intensive optimization calculation there can be instances where standard errors fail to 
compute even after convergence of the estimation process. When this occurs, the table entries read NA. This can 
arise when the distribution assumption is not able to fully capture the properties of the data. In Table 6, the Markov-
switching model for Russia fits better and all of the coefficient standard errors are computed. 
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volatility regime. The estimated coefficients of sigma support this switching between high- and 
low-volatility regimes. Table 5, for example, shows that for exchange rates of three emerging 
countries (Brazil, Mexico, and Russia), there is a strong distinction between a high- and low-
volatility regime, where the unconditional variance in the former is three to four times as large. 
The relative strength of the high volatility and low volatility regime is smaller in other countries. 
Except for India, the estimated sigma value in state 1 is larger than the estimated sigma value in 
state 2 indicating that state 1 has more volatility for eight of the nine countries studied. In the 
case of India, state 2 is the high volatility state. The RCM values are in agreement with the plots 
of the smoothed probabilities of being in the high volatility state (Figures 4 and 5). Smaller RCM 
values correspond to a clearer pattern in switching between states.
13
 According to the RCM 
values, the Markov-switching model with normal errors fits the best for India (smallest RCM) 
and the poorest for Norway (largest RCM). 
These results are different from the estimates in Atems et al. (2015), who find that the 
responses of exchange rates to oil price shocks are identical (i.e., depreciation) for exporting and 
importing countries. The most likely explanation seems to be that we use a non-linear 
framework, while Atems et al. (2015) employ a linear framework. Although they conduct some 
non-linear (or asymmetric) analyses in terms of how the effect of oil shocks vary between large 
and small countries and whether positive or negative shocks matter for exchange rates, their 
regression framework is essentially linear. Our analysis, therefore, emphasizes the need to use a 
non-linear framework to obtain theoretically consistent results.   
 
5.2 A robustness check on the error distribution 
In this section we investigate how robust the results of the Markov-switching model are to 
the choice of the probability distribution for the errors. In particular, we re-estimate the Markov-
switching model using a t distribution for the errors (Table 6). The use of a t-distribution is 
particularly useful in regime-switching models as it enhances the stability of regimes. This is 
because, with a normal distribution, “a large innovation in the low-volatility period will lead to a 
switch to the high-volatility regime earlier, even if it is a single outlier in an otherwise tranquil 
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 The transition probabilities vary across countries. It is not surprising that the responses of the real exchange rates 
to various oil shocks vary substantially across oil-exporting and oil-importing countries given the fact that, in 
practice, exchange rates are affected by a myriad of factors including the degree of pro- and counter-cyclicality of 
monetary and fiscal policies across countries, their exchange rate regimes, the degree of trade and financial 
openness, and the types of nonlinearities (e.g., real wage rigidities) that are present in the product and labor markets. 
19 
 
period” (Klaassen, 2002; p. 368). See Hamilton and Susmel (1994) for an early Markov-
switching approach with t-distributed innovations. A comparison of the RCM values for each 
country shows that the Markov-switching model with a t distribution fits better (lower RCM 
value) for Mexico, Norway, Russia, India, Japan, and South Korea. For Brazil, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, the Markov-switching model with a normal distribution fits better.  
Lagged exchange rates have a positive and significant impact on exchange rates in each 
country (Table 6). Also of interest is the fact that the estimated coefficient on the oil price 
variable is negative and statistically significant in at least one state for each of the oil exporting 
countries (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and Russia) and positive and significant in the case 
of the United Kingdom. This is consistent with the view that for oil exporting countries, higher 
oil prices lead to an appreciation of the local currency. Global economic demand shocks have a 
negative and statistically significant impact on exchange rates for Canada, Norway and Russia, 
and a positive and significant impact on exchange rates for Mexico. For the United Kingdom, the 
estimated coefficient on the global economic shock is positive and significant in state 1 and 
negative and significant in state 2. This is interpreted as an appreciation of the local exchange 
rate in state 1 and a depreciation of the local currency in state 2. An oil supply shock has a 
negative impact on Brazil’s exchange rate in state one and a positive and significant impact on 
exchange rates in state two.  In the case of Mexico, an oil supply shock has a negative significant 
impact on exchange rates in state two. For the United Kingdom, a supply shock decreases the 
real exchange rate ($US/$UK). 
For the oil importing countries, there is evidence that oil price shocks impact exchange rates 
in India, Japan, and South Korea. There is evidence of global economic demand shocks affecting 
exchange rates in Japan and South Korea. Overall, there is more evidence to show that oil shocks 
affect the exchange rates of oil exporting countries.  
Except for Brazil and Canada, the estimated coefficient on sigma is larger in state 1 than state 
2 indicating higher volatility in state 1 for these countries. Plots of being in the high volatility 
state are shown in Figures 6 and 7. The Markov-switching model with a t-distribution produces 
very clear state switching for Russia, India and South Korea which are consistent with the low 
RCM values recorded for these countries. In the case of Russia, for example, real exchange rates 
are in the high volatility state during the late 1990s and from 2008 onwards. The smoothed 
probability of the high volatility state for South Korea is even more pronounced with exchange 
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rates in the high probability state from 1996 to the end of the sample period. A general pattern 
emerges from the analysis that indicates that the Markov-switching model delivers clear regime 
inferences for most countries, as the RCMs are far from 100 (except for Canada) and the 
smoothed probability plots show clear evidence of switching between states. 
A reviewer asked a question about which set of results (those in Table 5 or those in Table 6) 
we prefer. If we have to choose between the two results, we should select the one with the t-
distribution.
14
 This is because, when residuals are normally distributed, a large innovation in the 
low-volatility period will lead to a switch to the high-volatility regime earlier, even if it is a 
single outlier in an otherwise tranquil period. Allowing for a t-distribution will thus enhance the 
stability of the regimes. Indeed, our results show that the staying probabilities p11 and p22 in a 
particular regime are relatively higher when the residual has a t-distribution (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Likewise, the expected duration of regimes (expressed in months) is slightly higher with a t-
distribution. As such, the t-distribution includes the normal distribution as the limiting case 
where the degrees of freedom go to infinity. Also notice that the RCM values for the Markov-
switching model estimated with a t-distribution are lower than the comparative values for the 
Markov-switching model estimated with a normal distribution for 6 of the 9 countries. 
 
6 Conclusions and implications 
There is a considerable literature looking at the impact of oil prices and oil price shocks on 
exchange rates. This is an important topic to study because an oil shock can affect a country’s 
terms of trade which can affect its competitiveness. The impact of oil shocks on exchange rates 
will differ depending upon whether a country is a net oil exporter of net oil importer. Most of the 
literature uses linear models to estimate the impact of oil prices on exchange rates.  
Our approach in this paper is to estimate the impact of oil shocks on real exchange rates 
using Markov-switching models. This approach has the advantage of capturing possible non-
linear impacts of oil shocks on exchange rates that linear models would be unable to detect. 
Moreover, in addition to including an oil price shock we also include variables to account for oil 
demand and oil supply shocks. This provides a more complete understanding of how the oil 
market affects real exchange rates.  
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 Marcucci (2005) illustrates the importance of fat tailed innovations, particularly for the purpose of regime 
identification. 
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There are several important findings that stem from the present analysis. First, the application 
of Markov-switching regime models with two regimes lends support to the underlying 
nonlinearities between the real exchange rate and oil shocks (demand and supply) for both oil 
exporting and importing economies. In the linear regression model, oil shocks had a statistically 
insignificant impact on exchange rates for five of the nine countries studied, indicating that with 
a linear model evidence of oil shocks affecting real exchange rates is limited. In the Markov-
switching model, oil shocks had a statistically significant impact on exchange rates in at least one 
state for each country providing more substantial evidence of oil shocks affecting real exchange 
rates. Additionally, the regime classification measure of Ang and Bekaert (2002) confirms that 
the estimated Markov-switching models distinguished very well between the two regimes.  
Second, we detect significant appreciation pressures in oil exporting economies after oil 
demand shocks. These results are robust across two different assumptions regarding the error 
distribution of residuals (normal and t distribution). In the case of oil importing countries the 
impact of oil demand shocks on exchange rates is more complex. We find only limited evidence 
that oil supply shocks affect exchange rates for either oil exporting or oil importing countries. 
Third, global economic demand shocks affect both oil exporting and oil importing countries, 
but the adjustments of exchange rates may differ according to their relative competitiveness in 
international markets. Therefore, a main implication of our findings is that oil (demand) shocks 
are an important factor in exchange rate configurations in oil exporting countries.   
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Table 1. Summary statistics on oil shocks and monthly real exchange rate returns 
   Supply Demand   Oil  BRA CAN  MEX  NOR  RUS  UK  IND  JAP  KOR  
observations 457 457 457 229 457 243 457 193 457 457 457 394 
Min -4.267 -4.664 -3.607 -11.785 -6.421 -15.775 -5.698 -6.904 -11.180 -6.367 -10.951 -8.571 
max 3.625 4.156 4.618 23.282 11.320 31.704 11.751 58.057 11.185 17.345 8.229 34.256 
median 0.035 0.012 0.046 -0.193 0.000 -0.390 -0.052 -0.601 0.034 0.039 0.139 -0.044 
mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.027 0.040 -0.009 -0.137 0.020 0.105 -0.042 0.021 
SE.mean 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.270 0.069 0.231 0.112 0.356 0.117 0.091 0.133 0.137 
std.dev 0.918 0.918 0.917 4.080 1.481 3.608 2.385 4.947 2.502 1.942 2.840 2.726 
skewness -0.682 -0.382 -0.028 1.783 0.628 3.187 0.265 8.606 -0.024 1.736 -0.501 5.496 
kurtosis 4.023 4.197 2.025 8.863 7.636 26.635 0.917 96.837 1.915 14.115 0.876 65.110 
normtest.W 0.938 0.947 0.981 0.857 0.943 0.726 0.989 0.434 0.982 0.898 0.983 0.635 
normtest.p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Supply denotes a global oil supply shock, Demand denotes a shock to global economic activity, and Oil denotes a shock to global oil prices. 
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Table 2. Unit root tests on oil shocks and monthly real exchange rate returns 
  DF-GLS (c) DF-GLS (t) KPSS (µ) KPSS (τ) 
Supply -1.653c -1.713 0.092 0.035 
Demand -2.580 b -4.227 a 0.116 0.085 
Oil -3.641 a -4.165 a 0.162 0.100 
BRA -3.557 a -4.050 a 0.207 0.105 
CAN -1.883 c -3.478 b  0.179 0.072 
MEX -2.552 b -3.924 a 0.053 0.048 
NOR -4.434 a -5.674 a 0.045 0.038 
RUS -4.485 a -4.328 a 0.199 0.165 b 
UK -4.428 a -5.366 a 0.032 0.030 
IND -1.429 -2.995 b 0.351 c 0.085 
JAP -3.056
 a
 -4.536
 a
 0.142 0.040 
KOR -4.793
 a
 -5.435
 a
 0.052 0.041 
Supply denotes a global oil supply shock, Demand denotes a shock to global  
economic activity, and Oil denotes a shock to global oil prices. A 
a,  b,
 
c
 denotes  
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively. 
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Table 3. BDS tests for monthly real exchange rate returns 
  m ε(1) ε(2) ε(3) ε(4) 
BRA 2 6.6948 5.5320 6.1247 6.0450 
 
2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 3 9.8731 7.5959 7.3864 6.5504 
 3 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CAN 2 4.5261 3.8869 3.4533 3.1324 
 2 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0017) 
 3 6.1864 4.9403 4.6208 4.4270 
 3 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
MEX 2 2.8992 3.5319 4.4941 4.7191 
 2 (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 3 3.1968 4.2920 5.0696 5.1645 
 3 (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
NOR 2 4.5071 5.8962 5.5082 5.6350 
 2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 3 6.1613 7.4496 6.4042 6.0449 
 3 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RUS 2 3.3897 1.9659 -0.2357 -0.4948 
 
2 (0.0007) (0.0493) (0.8137) (0.6208) 
 
3 5.0478 3.1643 -0.1150 -0.5129 
 
3 (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.9085) (0.6080) 
UK 2 4.9102 5.1158 5.2905 5.4070 
 2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 3 5.6912 6.5310 6.2205 5.8020 
  3 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 
IND 2 6.5695 5.9633 4.6265 2.7523 
 
2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0059) 
 
3 9.0179 8.1957 6.2021 3.8031 
 
3 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
JAP 2 2.1881 2.9852 3.6363 4.7036 
 
2 (0.0287) (0.0028) (0.0003) (0.0000) 
 
3 1.6504 1.8585 2.5903 3.6454 
 
3 (0.0989) (0.0631) (0.0096) (0.0003) 
KOR 2 9.8749 9.1612 10.0039 11.2724 
 
2 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
3 12.1156 10.4099 10.6452 11.3000 
 
3 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
The parameter m is the embedding dimension and ε is the epsilon values for close points  
(numerical values not reported). P values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4. The impact of oil shocks on real exchange rates- linear models 
  Constant Supply Demand Oil ΔFX(-1) R squared 
Brazil 0.0692 -0.0419 -0.2155 -0.3192 0.3754 a 0.1630 
 
(0.3086) (-0.0908) (-0.8396) (-1.0019) (5.7493)  
Canada 0.0269 0.0799 -0.2844 b  -0.2456 b  0.1686 a  0.0957 
 
(0.3961) (1.0458) (-2.3053) (-2.5386) (3.2076)  
Mexico 0.0723 -0.4620 0.0745 -0.3232 0.1811 a  0.0450 
 
(0.4544) (-0.9044) (0.4337) (-1.1508) (7.3463)  
Norway -0.0046 -0.0069 -0.1718 -0.3716 b  0.3194 a  0.1348 
 
(-0.0467) (-0.0730) (-0.9723) (-2.4246) (8.4156)  
Russia -0.0539 -1.6292 0.0494 -0.7140 a  0.0677 c  0.0663 
 
(-0.1420) (-1.3711) (0.1913) (-2.6693) (1.8233)  
U.K. 0.0123 -0.1082 0.2750
 c
  0.1828 0.2967
 a
  0.1100 
  (0.1140) (-0.8430) (1.8864) (1.2204) (6.6569)  
India 0.0754 -0.0844 0.0127 -0.1184 0.2169 a  0.0524 
 
(0.8731) (-1.1685) (0.1119) (-1.3546) (4.7188)  
Japan -0.0264 -0.0164 0.1500 0.0661 0.3213 a  0.1051 
 
(-0.2115) (-0.1249) (0.9564) (0.3996) (9.6528)  
S. Korea 0.0118 -0.1241 -0.0322 -0.1482 0.4374 a  0.1976 
 
(0.1234) (-0.8744) (-0.2460) (-1.0207) (9.0386)  
The dependent variable is the monthly return on real exchange rates. Supply denotes a global oil supply shock, 
Demand denotes a shock to global economic activity, and Oil denotes a shock to global oil prices. HAC t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. A 
a,  b,
 
c
 denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively. 
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Table 5. The impact of oil shocks on real exchange rates - Markov-switching models 
(normal distribution for the errors) 
 
 Country State Intercept Supply Demand Oil ΔFX(-1) sigma LL 
  A. Estimated Coefficients 
Brazil S1 0.4229 -0.1840 -0.4250 0.3196 0.5781 a  4.9422a -568.50 
  
(0.8447) (-0.2372) (-0.9116) (0.6318) (4.5322) (12.4503) 
 
 
S2 -0.3995 a  0.1311 -0.2129 -0.7003 a  0.0528 1.2725 a  
 
  
(-2.7387) (0.5305) (-1.5418) (-4.9149) (1.2776) (7.6921) 
 Canada S1 -0.1987 0.3290 -1.4628 a  -0.4109 0.0737 1.8698 a  -763.85 
  
(-0.7181) (0.7951) (-5.2712) (-1.5542) (0.5942) (9.5107) 
 
 
S2 0.1022 0.0901 0.0278 -0.1546 b  0.1279 a  1.1548 a  
 
  
(1.6193) (1.2564) (0.3669) (-2.1983) (2.6855) (24.9532) 
 Mexico S1 1.2493 -4.9106 -0.4853 -3.1247 0.2955 9.5998 a  -553.35 
  
(0.4521) (-1.1060) (-0.2514) (-0.8813) (1.0283) (5.1387) 
 
 
S2 -0.1916 -0.0281 0.3075 b  -0.0639 0.1577 b  1.9285 a  
 
  
(-1.2936) (-0.1159) (2.2597) (-0.4893) (2.4116) (14.1916) 
 Norway S1 0.2365 -0.1804 -0.2895 -1.1172 b  0.1889 c  2.2991 a  -1001.93 
  
(0.7805) (-0.7083) (-1.2868) (-2.2812) (1.6865) (15.2517) 
 
 
S2 -0.2592 0.1713 -0.0079 0.3595 0.4542 a  1.7573 a  
 
  
(-0.9411) (0.7891) (-0.0290) (0.9377) (3.3580) (4.5335) 
 Russia S1 0.2478 -2.0472 -0.0180 -0.9643 -0.2472 c  7.5180 a  -500.73 
  
(0.2437) (-1.3016) (-0.0309) (-1.0774) (-1.7185) (7.6728) 
 
 
S2 -0.4111 -0.6874 0.0781 -0.5014 a  0.8183 1.6783 
 
  
NA NA NA (-4.5489) NA NA 
 UK S1 -0.0362 -0.0460 0.5770
 b
  0.6234
 c
  0.3317
 a
  2.9050
 a
  -1011.32 
  (-0.1664) (-0.2176) (2.4650) (1.9542) (4.9140) (15.5006)  
 S2 0.1346 -0.1325 0.0705 -0.1302 0.1774 b  1.7370 a   
    (1.1066) (-0.8756) (0.5146 (-1.0635) (2.5626) (20.8041)  
India S1 -0.0054 -0.0367 -0.0783 0.1787 a  0.3516 a  0.9704 a  -862.38 
  
(-0.0828) (-0.4496) (-0.8128) (2.6180) (5.2593) (17.2354) 
 
 
S2 0.1904 -0.1690 0.0327 -0.5667 b  0.1851 a  2.5837 a  
 
  
(1.0017) (-0.7480) (0.1988) (-2.4626) (2.6136) (17.7752) 
 Japan S1 -0.7622 b  -0.0423 -0.0337 0.5762 b  0.4451 a  2.9770 a  -1079.97 
  
(-2.3352) (-0.1703) (-0.1394) (2.2555) (4.8273) (17.7723) 
 
 
S2 0.8765 a  0.0699 0.2540 -0.6761 a  0.1851 b  1.5924 a  
 
  
(3.8458) (0.3594) (1.1622) (-2.9010) (2.4245) (7.4531) 
 Korea S1 -3.6918 b  -4.5626 b  2.0698 a  -5.1592 a  2.5984 a  3.3742 a  -763.85 
  
(-2.1556) (-2.4248) (3.5555) (-4.2330) (10.0830) (4.7410) 
 
 
S2 -0.0988 -0.0178 -0.0067 0.0403 0.2611 a  1.4936 a  
 
  
(-1.2563) (-0.1922) (-0.0696) (0.4758) (8.5521) (24.8543) 
 
  
 
 
31 
 
B. Transition Probabilities and Expected Durations 
  P11 P12 P21 P22 DU1 DU2 RCM 
Brazil  0.8377 0.1448 0.1623 0.8551 6.16 6.90 35.89 
Canada  0.9146 0.0143 0.0854 0.9857 11.71 70.09 58.31 
Mexico  0.6709 0.0275 0.3291 0.9725 3.04 36.36 53.18 
Norway  0.5559 0.5314 0.4441 0.4686 2.25 1.88 86.66 
Russia  0.4601 0.4081 0.5399 0.5919 1.85 2.45 62.93 
UK  0.9805 0.0149 0.0195 0.9851 51.28 67.19 22.46 
India  0.9617 0.0504 0.0383 0.9496 26.11 19.83 21.62 
Japan  0.5339 0.5853 0.4661 0.4147 2.15 1.71 74.20 
Korea  0.4091 0.0239 0.5909 0.9761 1.69 41.85 39.74 
The dependent variable is the monthly return on real exchange rates. Supply denotes a global oil supply shock, 
Demand denotes a shock to global economic activity, and Oil denotes a shock to global oil prices. Sigma refers to 
the standard deviation of each state. Student t statistics are shown in parentheses. A 
a,  b, c
 denotes significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively.  The maximized log likelihood value is denoted as LL. RCM is 
the regime classification measure. The transition probabilities are reported as pij. The expected duration of being in 
state i are reported as Dui, i.e., Du1 for state 1 and Du2 for state 2. 
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Table 6. The impact of oil shocks on real exchange rates - Markov-switching models 
(Student-t distribution for the errors) 
 
 Country State Intercept Supply Demand Oil ΔFX(-1) sigma LL 
  A. Estimated Coefficients 
Brazil S1 -0.1507 -0.5374 c  0.0375 -0.4085 b  0.2813 a  1.8637 a  -564.43 
  
(-0.9293) (-1.8783) (0.2163) (-2.4827) (3.8750) (8.1877) 
 
 
S2 1.5582 4.5684 c  -2.1362 1.1501 0.3741 c  7.0149 a  
 
  
(0.9402) (1.8290) (-0.9980) (0.6419) (1.9261) (3.8468) 
 Canada S1 -0.3769 0.0450 -1.8914
 a
  -0.6513
 b
  0.4808
 b
  1.1586
 a
  -765.61 
  
(-1.1997) (0.1328) (-7.9187) (-2.2061) (2.2298) (5.9439) 
 
 
S2 0.0839 0.0532 0.0357 -0.1813 b  0.1273 a  1.2037 a  
 
  
(1.2136) (0.7353) (0.4473) (-2.4708) (2.8410) (25.2607) 
 Mexico S1 -0.7222 a  0.0781 0.1140 -0.0693 -0.0131 1.4861 a  -548.09 
  
(-5.1567) (0.3740) (0.8714) (-0.5821) (-0.3434) (10.1699) 
 
 
S2 2.6186 a  -1.3303 a  0.4519 b  -0.8523 a  0.4693 a  1.1586 b  
 
  
(7.4140) (-3.7067) (2.4539) (-3.1730) (4.6565) (2.1735) 
 Norway S1 -0.0261 0.0126 -0.4233 a  -0.2658 b  0.3229 a  2.1280 a  -996.17 
  
(-0.2387) (0.1107) (-3.3475) (-2.2081) (7.0025) (23.1249) 
 
 
S2 0.4941 b  -0.0527 0.4128 a  -1.3278 a  0.3311 a  1.5693 
 
  
(2.3184) (-0.2238) (2.6290) (-5.5179) (2.9624) NA 
 Russia S1 0.0177 -0.2202 0.1969 -1.2523 a  0.0228 2.1179 a  -391.00 
  
(0.0570) (-0.4071) (0.8404) (-4.7220) (0.7719) (7.3972) 
 
 
S2 -0.5439 a  -0.0742 -0.4548 a  -0.1144 0.3399 a  0.9791 a  
 
  
(-3.9201) (-0.4343) (-2.8600) (-1.2028) (3.6997) (9.3628) 
 UK S1 0.0947 -0.0245 0.5469 a  0.0486 0.2985 a  2.1653 a  -1016.75 
  (0.7506) (-0.1692) (4.1312) (0.3548) (5.8214) (17.2416)  
 S2 -0.5806 a  -0.5159 a  -1.2064 a  0.8213 a  0.1153 0.7149 a   
    (-3.2185) (-3.1758) (-7.3882) (5.1184) (1.1385) (5.2539)  
India S1 0.1100 -0.1537 0.0036 -0.5013 b  0.1990 a  1.9201 a  -847.06 
  
(0.6874) (-0.8010) (0.0251) (-2.4021) (3.0670) (11.8510) 
 
 
S2 -0.0084 -0.0214 -0.0489 0.1924 a  0.3658 a  0.9022 a  
 
  
(-0.1262) (-0.2620) (-0.4914) (2.8915) (5.2255) (12.4472) 
 Japan S1 1.08959 a 0.0986 0.2482 c -0.2801 c 0.3161 a 1.7994 a -1078.87 
  
(4.3241) (0.7346) (1.7378) (-1.8352) (6.0243) (10.6192) 
 
 
S2 -2.4663 a  -0.1561 0.1553 0.5270 b  0.6036 a  1.6912 a  
 
 
 (-6.2522) (-0.5279) (0.6727) (2.5195) (6.6396) (6.1245) 
 Korea S1 -0.1727 -0.0344 0.2359 -0.1684 0.3102 a  2.1662 a  -690.50 
  (-0.9968) (-0.1201) (1.3897) (-0.9838) (6.5112) (34.5928) 
 
 
S2 0.0141 -0.0038 -0.2313 a  0.1197 b  0.4848 a  0.6523 
 
 
 (0.2735) (-0.0786) (-3.1304) (2.0444) (8.8405) NA 
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  B. Transition Probabilities and Expected Durations 
  P11 P12 P21 P22 DU1 DU2 RCM 
Brazil  0.9774 0.1550 0.0226 0.8450 44.19 6.45 44.77 
Canada  0.2215 0.1078 0.7785 0.8922 1.28 9.28 74.07 
Mexico  0.8440 0.5746 0.1560 0.4254 6.41 1.74 51.70 
Norway  1.0000 0.0204 0.0000 0.9796 1.00E+06 49.03 45.62 
Russia  0.9827 0.0119 0.0173 0.9881 57.70 84.01 7.84 
UK  0.9118 0.4925 0.0882 0.5075 11.34 2.03 39.30 
India  0.9619 0.0328 0.0381 0.9672 26.26 30.46 20.89 
Japan  0.6157 0.8132 0.3843 0.1868 2.60 1.23 50.16 
Korea  0.9946 0.0053 0.0054 0.9947 183.90 190.29 3.26 
The dependent variable is the monthly return on real exchange rates. Supply denotes a global oil supply shock, 
Demand denotes a shock to global economic activity, and Oil denotes a shock to global oil prices. Sigma refers to 
the standard deviation of each state. Student t statistics are shown in parentheses. A 
a,  b, c
 denotes significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively. The maximized log likelihood value is denoted as LL. RCM is 
the regime classification measure. The transition probabilities are reported as pij. The expected duration of being in 
state i are reported as Dui. 
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Figure 1. Real exchange rates – oil exporting countries 
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Figure 2. Real exchange rates – oil importing countries 
 
Figure 3. Oil supply shocks, global economic activity demand shocks, and oil price shocks 
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Figure 4. Smoothed probability of high volatility state (state 1 for all countries) – oil exporting 
countries (normal distribution for the errors) 
 
 
Figure 5. Smoothed probability of high volatility state (state 1 for Japan and South Korea, state 2 
for India) – oil importing countries (normal distribution for the errors) 
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Figure 6. Smoothed probability of high volatility state (state 2 for Brazil and Canada, state 1 for 
others) – oil exporting countries (t distribution for the errors) 
 
 
Figure 7. Smoothed probability of high volatility state (state 1 for all countries) – oil importing 
countries (t distribution for the errors) 
